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Fourth Amendment Rights of Probationers:
The Lack of Explicit Probation Conditions
and Warrantless Searches
Taylor S. Rothmant

I. INTRODUCTION

A 2014 report by the Chicago Tribune found that Cook County
probation officers had teamed up with law enforcement officials over a
period of years to enter probationers' homes without warrants.'
Warrantless searches of probationers may violate the Fourth
Amendment. Further, the Tribune's report revealed that searches of
probationers created distrust and led to suspicion that officers
deliberately planted incriminating evidence or seized probationers'
property to obtain greater bargaining power over probationers. 2 The
Tribune's report triggered a reevaluation in the public and academic
spheres of police treatment of probationers in Chicago, as the problem
might be more widespread than originally thought. 3 The nowprominent question of law enforcement's ability to enter probationers'
homes without warrants demands an inquiry into the actual scope of
probationers' Fourth Amendment rights.
In 2013, an estimated 3,910,600 adults were on probation and
853,200 were on parole in the United States.4 The primary purpose of
probation and parole is to rehabilitate an offender by placing him or her
back into the community, with various conditions restricting behavior
accompanying the release. 5 Probation is a judicial act whereby, in lieu
of incarceration, a convicted criminal offender is released into the

t B.A. 2014, University of Michigan; J.D. Candidate 2017, The University of Chicago
Law School.
' Cynthia Dizikes & Todd Lighty, Warrantless Searches Draw Criticism, CHI. TRIB.,
May 21, 2014, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-05-21/news/ct-probation-searches-met2014052 1_-probation-department-searches-probationers [https://perma.cc/SS78-PDHM].
2 See id.
See id.
ERINN J. HERBERMAN & THOMAS P. BONczAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248029, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, 1 (2014) (Revised
Jan. 21, 2015).

See Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 213 (1937).
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officer.6
of a probation
the
supervision
under
community
Administratively, this release may be accomplished either by
suspending the prison sentence or by not imposing the sentence in the
first place.7 The Supreme Court has described probation as a
"reforming discipline," 8 restoring offenders to society when courts deem
them to be "good social risks."9 By way of contrast, a parolee is released
under the supervision of a parole officer for the remainder of his
sentence after serving a portion of his judicially-imposed sentence in a
penal institution. 10 Parole is an administrative act within the exclusive
discretion of correctional authorities."
In varying contexts, the Court has given mixed guidance on
whether there is a difference in the constitutional status of
13
probationeis and parolees. 12 In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Court, in
applying the due process clause to probation revocation proceedings,
of probation . . . is constitutionally
stated that, "[R]evocation
indistinguishable from the revocation of parole." 14 In practice, however,
the Court treats probationers and parolees differently under the Fourth
Amendment. Probationers are subjected to fewer restrictions than
parolees, who are treated as more akin to prisoners.1 5 It is important to
note that when addressing difficult balancing issues between a
defendant's right to privacy and the government's interest in protecting
society and encouraging rehabilitation, the Court held that the formal
distinction between parolees and probationers causes them to hold
16
different expectations of privacy.
Supreme Court precedent on the Fourth Amendment rights of
probationers and parolees consists of three main cases. In Griffin v.
Wisconsin,1 7 the Supreme Court upheld warrantless searches of

6 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 165-71 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].

See id.
Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435 (1943).
Id.; see Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943) (describing the purpose of
probation as "to provide an individualized program offering a young or unhardened offender an
opportunity to rehabilitate himself without institutional confinement under the tutelage of a
probation official and under the continuing power of the court to impose institutional punishment
for his original offense in the event that he abuse this opportunity").
7

o

See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 164-65.

See id.; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1972).
12

See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265-66 (9th Cir. 1975).

13

411 U.S. 778 (1973).

14
s

Id. at 782 n.3.

See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006).
See, e.g., id. (using the difference in status on continuum of state-imposed punishments
between parolee and probationer to explain a parolee's lesser expectation of privacy).
17 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
1
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probationers' homes under the "special needs" doctrine of the Fourth
Amendment. The special needs doctrine provides an exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements during situations in which
special needs beyond the ordinary needs of law enforcement render
these requirements impractical.1 8 In United States v. Knights, 19 the
Court reaffirmed that a warrantless search of a probationer's home
that is supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition
of the probation is permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 20 To
determine the reasonableness of a search, Knights established a
balancing test weighing the intrusion upon individual privacy against
the promotion of legitimate government interests. 21 In both Griffin and
Knights, however, the Supreme Court noted that the sentencing court
explicitly set out a probation condition allowing police to conduct a
warrantless search of the probationer's home. 22 Most recently, in
Samson v. California,23 the Supreme Court extended the Knights
balancing test to suspicionless searches in the context of parolees. 24 The
Court left open the question of whether the constitutionality of a
warrantless search depended on the explicit search condition in the
defendant's probation agreement, or whether the non-law enforcement
purpose of parole-rehabilitation-and reduced privacy interests of
probationers or parolees alone was sufficient to permit such searches.
There is a circuit split over whether an officer's warrantless search
of a probationer's home violates the Fourth Amendment when the
terms of probation do not explicitly authorize warrantless searches. A
warrantless search condition typically provides that a defendant will
submit to a search "by any probation officer or law enforcement officer"
as a condition of his or her probation. 25 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
have held that probationers cannot object to warrantless searches of
their homes even without such an explicit condition in their probation.
In United States v. Keith,26 the Fifth Circuit held that a warrantless
residence search supported by reasonable suspicion was permissible
under the Fourth Amendment. 27 In United States v. Carter,28 the
Eleventh Circuit applied the Knights balancing test to similarly hold
s Id. at 873, 880.
534 U.S. 112 (2001).

19

2{)

Id. at 121-22.

21

See id. at 119-21.
See id. at 114; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870-71.
547 U.S. 843 (2006).
Id. at 857.
See Knights, 534 U.S. at 116.
375 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 350-51.
566 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2009).

22
23
24
25

26

17
28
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that reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct was a constitutionally
sufficient basis for the warrantless search of the probationer's home. 2 9
The Fourth Circuit has taken a different approach. In United
States v. Hill,30 the Fourth Circuit declined to use the Knights
balancing test, holding that reasonable suspicion that a probationer is
violating conditions of probation is insufficient to justify a warrantless
search; an officer must have a warrant supported by probable cause. 31
In contrast to the viewpoint of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the
Fourth Circuit pointed out that the probationer's knowledge of the
warrantless search conditions in the respective probation agreements
in Griffin and Knights was "critical" to the Supreme Court's
determination that the probationers had diminished expectations of
privacy. 32 The Sixth and Second Circuits, while not directly addressing
the circuit split, likewise have put forth the view that searches of
probationers require adherence to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement, such that warrantless searches by probation officers when
there is no probation agreement or state regulation authorizing them
are presumptively unreasonable. The other circuits are largely silent on
the issue, most likely because they have not yet been presented with
the issue of warrantless searches in the absence of probation
agreements explicitly allowing them.
This circuit split impacts an important area of criminal law. A
probationer's constitutional protection against warrantless searches is
of the utmost importance, especially because proposed initiatives to
curtail mass incarceration could increase the total number of
resolving the circuit split will
probationers. 33 Furthermore,
significantly impact how law enforcement personnel conduct their
searches, and will affect the basic interactions between probation
officers and police officers. 34 Additionally, because probationers, the
ones who would benefit from the resolution of this circuit split in favor
of the Fourth Circuit, constitute too small of a political group and are
profoundly disenfranchised, they will not have the requisite power to

29

Id. at 975.

30

776 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 249-50.

3'

Id. at 249.
See, e.g., Byron Tau, Obama Decries 'Mass Incarceration'in Call for Prisons Overhaul,
WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2015), http: /www.wsj.com/articles/obama-decries-mass-incarceration-in-callfor-prisons-overhaul-1436917797 [https://perma.cc/96DQ-SADY]; Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Get a
Little Less Tough on Crime, U.S. NEWS (May 9, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/
2014/05/09/its-time-for-prison-reform-and-an-end-to-mandatory-minimum-sentences
[https://perma.cc/Q65R-ETF5].
8
See Dizikes & Lighty, supra note 1.
32
3
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lobby legislators for their rights. 35 Because those affected by the split
are politically powerless, the split is unlikely to be addressed by
Congress, and the Supreme Court may need to grant certiorari to
resolve it.36
Part II of this Comment will describe the doctrinal development of
the warrant requirement and its exceptions. Part III will then discuss
the application of the warrant requirement in the context of
probationers' Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, Part III will
outline the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue. Part III
will then discuss the unique relationship between a probationer and
probation officer that underlies these cases, explaining how the dual
role of probation officers can make it difficult to determine whether a
probationer's constitutional rights have been violated. Part IV will
discuss the different approaches that courts take when analyzing this
question, and will suggest how best to understand the circuit split. Part
V subsequently will describe the two distinct solutions that one could
take to resolve the circuit split: the legal solution and the policy
solution. The Comment will argue that both approaches favor applying
the Fourth Circuit's analytical framework. The Fourth Circuit's
approach-requiring officers to have probable cause before conducting a
warrantless search when the terms of the probation do not explicitly
permit it-is more meritorious because it is grounded in case-based
analysis, is truest to the spirit of the Fourth Amendment, and
adequately balances the policy concerns regarding probationers without
limiting their fundamental right to privacy.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT AND ITS EXCEPTIONS

The Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is an important
shield against impermissible searches. This section will proceed by
analyzing the warrant requirement jurisprudence with respect to the
Fourth Amendment, and the recognized exceptions that have followed.

' See Angela Behrens, Voting-Not Quite A Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and
Legislative Challenges to Felon Disfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231, 239 (2004) (stating
that felon disenfranchisement laws remove the right to vote based on a felony conviction); Jason
Belmont Conn, Felon DisenfranchisementLaws: PartisanPolitics in the Legislatures, 10 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 495, 499 (2005) (stating that disfranchisement while serving a sentence-which
includes while incarcerated, on parole, or on probation-is typical of state disenfranchisement
regimes. In fact, "[a]lmost three-quarters of the disenfranchised population are no longer in prison
but are on probation, parole, or have completed their sentences.").
3
See Behrens, supra note 35, at 241 ("Without [the right to vote], the governed population
has no opportunity to challenge laws to which they are subjected. The loss of voting
rights . . . shifts a citizen to a second-class status.") (internal citations omitted).
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Law Enforcement Searches and the Warrant Requirement

A.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states
that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.37
While the text offers a seemingly absolute shield against
warrantless searches, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
that "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. 38
Reasonableness of a search is determined by "assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and,
on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests."39 Much of the Fourth Amendment
protection derives from the Warrant Clause, which requires that
"absent certain exceptions, police obtain a warrant from a neutral and
disinterested magistrate before embarking upon a search." 40 Unless
there are exigent circumstances, warrantless searches and seizures
inside a home are presumptively unreasonable and, therefore,
unconstitutional. 41 Further, to obtain a judicial warrant, a law
enforcement officer must show probable cause. 42 Probable cause, in
turn, requires more than a mere suspicion of wrongdoing. 43 Therefore,
where probable cause is required, a finding of reasonable suspicion
alone will not suffice.
The Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States 44 provides
the test for determining what constitutes a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 45 Finding that the placement of a
bug on the outside of a phone booth in an effort to eavesdrop constitutes
a search, Katz marked the first time that the Court did not require a
physical invasion by the government to invoke the Fourth Amendment

*
3

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).

Franks v. Delaware,
Payton v. New York,
42 Griffin v. Wisconsin,
43 See Illinois v. Gates,
'0

4'

" 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 353.

41

438
445
483
462

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

154, 164 (1978).
573, 586 (1980).
868, 877 (1987).
213, 231 (1983).
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successfully. 46 In Katz and subsequent decisions, the courts have held
that electronic monitoring,47 eavesdropping, 48 and intentional video
surveillance 49 fall within the meaning of a Fourth Amendment "search,"
and thus require warrants supported by probable cause.
Furthermore, if a person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy,"
the government cannot conduct the search without a warrant.50 The
standard for reasonableness has two prongs. First, a person must
exhibit an actual expectation of privacy.5 1 Second, the expectation must
be one that society is prepared to recognize as objectively
"reasonable." 52 In assessing the reasonableness
of a privacy
expectation, courts must either predict whether a reasonable third
party would have a privacy expectation in a given setting, or as recent
scholarship argues, draw upon surveys of public opinion to determine if
people expect privacy in a given context. 53 If both of these requirements
are met, any warrantless search by police is "presumptively
unreasonable." 54
B.

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement

In general, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.55 There are, however, a few well-delineated
exceptions. 56 First, under the "plain view" doctrine, if something is in
"plain view," the officer did not have to search to find it and, therefore,
may immediately seize the incriminating evidence without a warrant.5 7
Second, the "open fields" doctrine states that open fields or spaces do
not receive Fourth Amendment protection because they are not among
the delineated spaces receiving Fourth Amendment protections in the
Constitution, and there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in

See id.
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
4
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
* See United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 508-12 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Torres,
751 F.2d 875, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1984).
5 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.17 (1984) ("A container which can
support a reasonable expectation of privacy may not be searched, even on probable cause, without
46

17

a warrant.").

5' See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988) ("The warrantless search and
seizure . . . would violate the Fourth Amendment only if respondents manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy . . . that society accepts as objectively reasonable.").
"

See id.

5 See Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth
Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 226-27 (2016).
5
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
"

Id. at 357.

56

Id.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465
(1971).
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open fields.5 8 Third, the government may randomly search a person
without a warrant when boarding a plane or entering a courthouse. 59
The justification for the aforementioned exception is the limited search
doctrine of Terry v. Ohio,60 in which the officer perceives a danger and
searches solely to disarm the suspect, or where the search is in
response to exigent national circumstances or imminent threats. 6 1
Other general exceptions to the warrant requirement have been made
for investigative detentions, 62 searches incident to arrest, 6 3 consent
searches, 64 inventory searches, 65 and administrative searches. 66
In the probationary context, the "special needs" doctrine is a highly
relevant exception to the warrant requirement. The Court has held that
there are "limited circumstances in which the usual rule [of requiring
individualized suspicion] does not apply."67 One such circumstance is
special needs cases. 68 The Court applies this test when "special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable." 69 The exception "grew out
of the need to conduct programmatic investigations of areas when
individualized suspicion was precluded by the circumstances."7 0 The
test proceeds by first determining whether the search furthers a special
need outside of general law enforcement purposes. For example, special
needs have been found in the regulatory context, such as ensuring
compliance with municipal housing inspections, and in nonregulatory
contexts, such as in roadside checkpoints, borders, schools, and
employee drug tests.7 1 The special needs in these settings concerned

8 See Jennifer Granholm, Video Surveillance on Public Streets: The Constitutionality of
Invisible Citizen Searches, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 687, 693 (1987); U.S. CONST. amend. TV; Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
' See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770-72 (4th Cir. 1972); Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir.
1972).
6 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
" Id. at 20, 26-27.
12 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 683 (1985).
6 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981).
64 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
6 See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987).
6 See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971).
67 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
8 See, e.g., minois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2004) (holding search to be constitutional
when roadblock was set up to question passing motorists about crime that recently had occurred
on that road because the purpose of the search was not general crime prevention, but the
gathering of information).
6 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
70 Robert Cacace, Samson v. California: Tearing Down A Pillar of Fourth Amendment
Protections, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 231 (2007).
71 See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447, 455 (1990) (roadside
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public health, education, immigration considerations that are unique to
border enforcement, and school and workplace safety, respectively.
Next, the government's interest in the search must be weighed against
the individual's interest in not being searched. 72 The ordinary goals of
law enforcement cannot be used to establish a special need-the special
need must be the "immediate objective" of the proposed search. 73 If the
primary purpose of a search is to detect evidence of ordinary
wrongdoing, rather than promote any special need, it will not be upheld
as constitutional under the special needs doctrine. 74
III. PROBATIONERS' EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY

The status of the warrant requirement is generally clear in regards
to ordinary citizens, though that is not true with respect to
probationers. The two main tests used to determine whether an
impingement occurred on probationers' rights under the Fourth
Amendment are the special needs test and the totality of the
circumstances balancing test. These approaches contemplate the
unique circumstances surrounding a probationer's rights as divergent
from those of ordinary citizens, as well as the specific purposes
underlying probation as a corrective mechanism. In the following
sections, I will lay out how the Supreme Court has applied these two
tests and then discuss how the unusual relationship between a
probationer and a probation officer has influenced the Court's
jurisprudence.
A.

Supreme Court Jurisprudence

In the case of probationers, the special needs doctrine holds that
the dual purposes of probation-rehabilitation of the probationer and
protecting society from further criminal violations-might, in certain
circumstances, be sufficiently important to trump the probationer's
privacy interests that citizens with greater expectations of privacy
otherwise enjoy.75 In Griffin v. Wisconsin, the Court extended the

checkpoints); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 623-24 (1989) (employee drug
tests); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (schools); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-62
(1976) (borders); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (municipal housing
inspections).

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001).
See id. at 83.
74 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35-36, 41 (2000) (striking down
police program that stopped motorists and checked them for possession of narcotics because it did
72

7

not promote any special needs; rather, its "primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary

criminal wrongdoing").
7
See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-76 (1987).
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special needs doctrine to state operation of probation systems.7 6 Griffin
was convicted of resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and obstructing an
officer.7 7 The court placed him on probation subject to a number of
restrictions, including the requirement that he submit to searches of
his home without a warrant as long as there were reasonable grounds
to believe the presence of contraband existed.7 8 Acting on a police
officer's tip that Griffin had guns in his apartment, his probation officer
conducted a search, which uncovered a handgun.7 9 The Court
articulated that certain "special needs" would sometimes render the
warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable.8 0 In affirming
Griffin's conviction, the Supreme Court thus held that the special needs
of the Wisconsin probation system justified the departure from the
usual warrant and probable cause requirement.8 1 The Court reasoned
that supervision of probationers was a "special need" of the State that
"permit[ted] a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be
constitutional if applied to the public at large." 82 The Griffin Court did
not decide whether warrantless searches of probationers were
permissible in the absence of a state regulation that explicitly
authorized them. 8 3
searches of
The constitutional parameters of warrantless
probationers' homes were not entirely clear following Griffin. The next
probation and parole issue that the Court decided was in Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott,84 where the Court was
presented with the question of whether to apply the exclusionary rule
to evidence offered at a parole revocation hearing.8 5 Five months after
his release from serving the minimum prison term for murder, Scott
had five firearms in his home, which his parole officer uncovered during
a search. 86 The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole admitted

"

Id. at 875-76.

77
7

Id. at 870.
Id. at 870-71.

See id. at 871.
8 See id. at 873 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)).
7

s'

See id. at 874.

8'

Id. at 875.

8 See id. at 880 ("The search of Griffin's residence was 'reasonable' . . . because it was
conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing probationers. This conclusion makes it
unnecessary to consider whether . .. any search of a probationer's home by a probation officer is
lawful when there are 'reasonable grounds' to believe contraband is present.") (emphasis added).
84 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
8
Id. at 359, 362-63 (defining the exclusionary rule as a judicially created means of deterring
illegal searches and seizures, whereby evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights is excluded from the subsequent criminal trial).
'

Id. at 360.
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evidence of this violation of parole at Scott's revocation hearing.8 7 The
lower courts held that the search of the defendant's home violated the
Fourth Amendment because the parole officers lacked "reasonable
suspicion" of a violation before making the search.88 On appeal,
however, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the search
were assumed unreasonable, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
should not apply at a revocation proceeding.89 The Court thus
sidestepped the issue of whether any level of suspicion was
constitutionally required to search a probationer who had agreed to
suspicionless searches.
The Supreme Court, however, did provide some guidance in United
States v. Knights.9 0 In Knights, the defendant was placed on probation
for a drug conviction. 91 A term of the defendant's probation authorized
warrantless, suspicionless searches and seizures by any peace officer. 92
When a detective investigating arson developed a reasonable suspicion
that the defendant was involved in these acts, he searched the
defendant's apartment, finding explosives and arson equipment. 93 The
Knights Court upheld the constitutionality of the warrantless searches
of probationers' homes on the ground that "reasonable suspicion" alone
is sufficient to render an officer's search legal. 94 The Court explained:
"When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to
a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough
likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the
probationer's
significantly
diminished
privacy
interests
is
reasonable." 95 Probationers have significantly diminished privacy
interests because "by virtue of their status alone" 96 "probationers do not
enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled."9 7 The
Court also justified the reduction in absolute liberty by identifying two
legitimate government interests: the integration of probationers back
into the community and combating recidivism. 98 The Knights Court

"

Id. at 360-61.
See id. at 361-62.
9 See id. at 369 (explaining that other deterrents, such as "departmental training and
discipline and the threat of damages actions," makes the harsh deterrent of exclusion
unwarranted).
" 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
Id. at 114.
9
8

92

Id.

" Id. at 114-15.
See id. at 121.
* Id.
* Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006).
7
Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.
9 See id. at 121.
94
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established the now traditional balancing test that considers the
totality of the circumstances in weighing individual interests against
government interests.9 9 Examining the circumstances, the Court found
that the search was reasonable in balancing the governmental interests
in crime prevention and public safety with the individual interest in
freedom from overbroad searches. 100 Here, the fact that there was
"reasonable suspicion" to justify the search of the defendant was
important. Due to prior investigation, police had reasons for suspecting
that the defendant was engaging in illegal conduct.10 1 The Court thus
found that this suspicion satisfied the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement, given the defendant's reduced privacy
expectation as a probationer. 102
Importantly, in both Griffin and Knights the terms of the probation
explicitly stated that the probationer's home was subject to warrantless
searches. Specifically, the Knights Court described the defendant's
probation search condition as a "salient circumstance" 103 affecting the
"balance of [the] considerations [which] require[d] no more than
reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of [the] probationer's
house." 0 4 Neither Court addressed whether these searches would be
constitutionally permissible if the terms of the probation did not
include a warrantless search condition.
10 5 the Supreme Court
More recently, in Samson v. California,
addressed a similar issue in the context of a parolee's Fourth
Amendment rights. In Samson, an officer approached the defendant
who he knew was on parole after observing the defendant walking
down a street with a woman and child.10 6 Based solely on the
defendant's status as a parolee, the officer searched him and found a
cigarette box containing a plastic baggie of methamphetamine.1 07 The
Samson Court extended the Knights balancing test to suspicionless
searches of parolees, holding that the suspicionless search of the
defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 108 Thus, it appears
officers may subject parolees to a warrantless stop and search at any
time even if the officer has no grounds to suspect wrongdoing at all, so
9
'"
`o
linked
102
10

See id. at 119-21.
See id.
See id. at 114-15 (describing activity of long-time suspect Simoneau and surveillance that
the defendant's home to Simoneau's potentially criminal activities).
See id. at 121.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 118-21.

os
10
107

108

547 U.S. 843 (2006).
Id. at 846-47.
id.

See id. at 857.
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long as this condition is disclosed to the prisoner prior to his release on
parole. The Court reasoned that California had an "overwhelming
interest" in supervising parolees, and that interest warranted privacy
intrusions that courts would otherwise not tolerate under the Fourth
Amendment. 109 The government's interest included preventing future
crimes committed by recidivist parolees. 110 The Samson Court, like the
Knights Court in the context of probationers,1 1 1 pointed out that the
defendant's parolee status was "salient," and was a "point on a
continuum of possible punishments," which alone was enough to justify
his reduced access to liberty in comparison to ordinary citizens. 112 The
Court further reasoned that, unlike probationers, "parolees have fewer
expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin
to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment."1 1 3 While the
Samson Court pointed out this distinction between parolees and
probationers, it does not appear to have changed the Court's Fourth
Amendment analysis. As in Knights, the Court references a"continuum" of punishments to justify why there is a diminished
expectation of privacy. Therefore, it is not clear whether this "no
suspicion required" rule also applies to probationers, who seem, in
practice, to have greater constitutional rights than parolees.
B.

The Role of a Probation Officer

Underlying the rationale of much of the Supreme Court
jurisprudence above lies the unique relationship between a probationer
and probation officer. In Griffin, a probation officer-not an ordinary
law enforcement officer-conducted the search, which was supported by
reasonable suspicion.1 14 Griffin did not imply that a probationer might
be subjected to full search at the whim of any law enforcement officer
he happens to encounter. With a probation officer, "there is an ongoing
supervisory relationship-and one that is not, or at least not entirely,
adversarial-between
the
object
of the
search
and
the
decisionmaker."1 1 5 In fact, based on this reasoning, the Court in
Knights forwent any reliance on the special needs doctrine when it
upheld the search of a probationer by a law enforcement officer. 116 The

1o.
10

See id. at 853.
See id. at 853-54.

.. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
112
Samson, 547 U.S. at 848, 850.
"

Id. at 850.

114

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 871 (1987).
Id. at 879.
Samson, 547 U.S. at 859-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

"1
"1
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Knights Court instead relied on an interest balancing test. 117 In his
Samson dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the special role of
probation officers was critical to the analysis in Griffin because it
meant that the State's "special need" was the interest in supervising a
probationer's assimilation into society, rather than just law
enforcement's general goal of detecting crime. 118 This move away from
the special needs doctrine in Knight and Samson was essential because
in both cases law enforcement personnel conducted the warrantless
searches, and none of the Court's special needs precedents have
endorsed the "routine inclusion of law enforcement, both in the design
of the policy and in using arrests .

.

. to implement the system designed

for the special needs objectives." 119
The role of a probation officer is akin to that of "a social therapist
in an authoritative setting" because of his or her dual role both to
prohibit "behavior that is deemed dangerous to the restoration of the
individual into normal society" 120 and to give probationers guidance. 12 1
This dual role complicates the determination of whether a probation
officer impinges on a probationer's constitutional rights. For instance,
routine inspections and home visits allow the probation officer to obtain
information about the probationer's habits and lifestyle, furthering the
officer's ability to construct an effective rehabilitation program. 122
These visits, however, also further the probation officer's responsibility
to the public, in that if he sees anything impermissible, he should use
his authority to prevent the probationer from engaging in further
criminal activity. 123 As such, the responsibility to both give guidance
and enforce the law creates a conflict in the relationship between
probationer and probation officer.
The broad authority bestowed upon a correctional officer can also
become "simply a means of circumventing normal constitutional
procedures in a criminal investigation." 12 4 As a probation officer moves
further from the guidance approach and closer to the enforcer
approach, the broad discretion that allows the probation officer to
intrude upon the privacy of the probationer seemingly becomes less
justified. This broad discretion becomes even more dangerous when
117 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119-21 (2001).
Samson, 547 U.S. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 88 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478 (1972) (stating the dual role of the parole officer).
121
See D.C. Pishko, Fourth Amendment Limitations on Probation and Parole Supervision,
1976 DuKE L.J. 71, 76-77 (1976) (citing Charles L. Newman, Concepts of Treatment in Probation
"s

119

and ParoleSupervision, 25 FED. PROBATION 11, 16 (1961)).
122

See id. at 77.

123

See id.

124

See id. at 78.
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correctional officers and police work together, with police relying on
correctional officers for investigational support. 125
There are important safeguards to prevent abuses by probation
officers, but these safeguards have generally been watered down by the
above line of cases. Most important is the warrant requirement, which
limits the discretion exercised by the officer by substituting the
judgment of a neutral magistrate for that of the officer. 126 A court may,
as seen in Griffin, excuse the warrant requirement when the
government has "special needs," which make the warrant requirement
impractical. 127 And even if the search falls into an exception to the
warrant requirement, the government must still show probable
cause. 128 With that said, probable cause is a flexible standard that
courts typically evaluate in the totality of the circumstances. 12 9 Lastly,
under the exclusionary rule, trial courts exclude from trial evidence
gathered in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 130 The
exclusionary rule, however, only applies in criminal trials, not in
probationary revocation hearings. 13 1 Therefore, while there are
important tools that could be used to curtail the broad discretion
afforded to probation officers, there is still plenty of room for courts to
give back such discretion through various exceptions or interpretative
tools.
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Some time passed before the circuit courts had an opportunity to
implement the Court's decisions regarding the Fourth Amendment
rights of probationers. The circuits have since split over the proper
treatment of warrantless searches of a probationer's home when the
probationer was not put on notice that he or she would be subject to
these searches as part of the probation sentence. Going forward, I will
discuss how different circuits have interpreted the above Supreme
Court jurisprudence. In an effort to understand the circuit split, I will
address the implications of the circuits' differing opinions.

2" See Dizikes & Lighty, supra note 1.
126
127
128

129

See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975).
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983).

1o
See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (citing Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
131
See Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998).
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Circuits Supporting Warrantless Searches of Probationers

A.

The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that warrantless
searches of probationers' homes are permissible, regardless of whether
warrantless searches are provided as a term of probation. In United
States v. Keith,132 a defendant was on probation for possessing a
destructive device when his probation officer, on a tip from a local
retailer that the defendant had purchased bomb-making materials,
searched the defendant's home and found said materials. 133 There was
no written condition of probation or state regulation explicitly
authorizing warrantless searches of the defendant's home. 13 4 Instead,
the court pointed to the consistent line of case law in Louisiana that
approved of the practice of searching probationers' homes based on
reasonable suspicion. 135 Based on this, the Fifth Circuit held that a
warrantless residence search supported by reasonable suspicion was
permissible. 136 The court reasoned that the presence or absence of an
explicit term within the probation sentence was immaterial because
under Griffin v. Wisconsin and United States v. Knights, "the needs of
the probation system outweigh the privacy rights of the probationers"
who do not enjoy the same expectation of privacy as ordinary
citizens. 137 Accordingly, given the probationers' diminished privacy
expectations, 13 8 officers can search their homes without warrants and
without violating their Fourth Amendment rights.
While not explicitly stating what test it applied, the Fifth Circuit
appeared to adopt the Knights balancing test. The court, however,
described the government's interest with language seen in the Griffin
special needs test, such that the "needs" of the probation system
outweigh the privacy rights of probationers. 1 39 In an attempt to validate
the search, given the lack of a probation condition or state regulation
allowing it, the court confounds the two tests-by apparently using the
special needs exception as a factor in balancing the totality of the
circumstances. There is no Supreme Court case that supports the
combination of the two tests. Further, it predisposes the balancing test

375 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 347.
1

116

Id. at 349.

See id. at 350.
See id. at 350-51.

137 Id. at 350.
'm See id. (noting that while there was no written order of probation or an explicit Louisiana
state regulation permitting the search, the common practice in Louisiana of sustaining searches of
probationers' homes on reasonable suspicion of violation was enough to make the defendant aware
of his decreased expectation of privacy as if there had been a Griffin-like state regulation in place).
Id.
139
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in favor of the government. The special needs analysis here is used to
increase the weight of the government's interest, thereby decreasing
the weight of the probationer's.
The Eleventh Circuit has also held that warrantless searches of
probationers' homes are permissible, regardless of whether warrantless
searches are provided as a term of probation. In United States v.
Carter,140 the defendant was on probation for possession with intent to
distribute crack cocaine and possession of a firearm by a felon. The
defendant's probation officer planned and executed a warrantless
search of the defendant's home on the intuition that the defendant's
recent "lifestyle," such as moving to his own townhome and purchasing
three cars, could not be supported by his newly formed business. 141 The
terms of the defendant's probation did not contain an explicit condition
authorizing warrantless searches. 142 The Eleventh Circuit applied the
balancing test from Knights to hold that reasonable suspicion, not
probable cause, was an appropriate standard, given a probationer's
diminished expectation of privacy. 143 Here, the government had a high
interest in preventing drug and violence-related crimes-the defendant
was on probation for both a violent and a drug-related felony, and thus,
may have had a higher propensity to commit more crimes and hide the
evidence of them. 144 Further, although the defendant did not have a
condition of probation that required him to submit to warrantless
searches of his home, a condition of probation required him to submit to
home visits by his probation officer. 145 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned
that this condition created a reduced expectation of privacy. Submitting
to home visits, however, does not equate to submitting to warrantless
searches of one's home-the use of the phrase "warrantless" in the
latter, and the constitutional implications it carries categorically
distinguishes the two. Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
"[w]hen a probationer has a condition of probation reducing his
expectation of privacy, and the government has a higher interest in
monitoring the probationer due to the nature of his criminal history, a
search can be permissible when supported only by reasonable
suspicion." 146

140
141
142
143
144
141
146

566 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 972.
Id. at 975.
See id. at 974.
Id.
See id. at 975.
Id.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

856

[ 2016

Prior to Carter, in United States v. Yuknavich, 147 the Eleventh
Circuit decided a case that dealt with the search of a probationer's
computer who was convicted of possessing child pornography. 148 The
Eleventh Circuit held that the warrantless search of the computer by
the probation officers was a reasonable means of enforcing the specific
probation condition restricting Internet usage, despite the absence of a
probation condition authorizing searches generally. 149 The court
reasoned that, "assuming the lack of a search condition heightened [the
defendant's] expectation of privacy, it did not sway the Knights
balancing test such that the probation officers needed more than
reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of [the defendant's]
computer."1 50 The Eleventh Circuit believed that the lack of an explicit
search condition was permissible because of the government's more
significant interest in supervising probationers. 151 By this view, a
probationer is entitled to such a low expectation of privacy, that even
when the search is conducted in the absence of a search condition, he is
still not entitled to relief.
Circuits Against Warrantless Searches of Probationers

B.

The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits'
conclusions concerning the constitutionality of warrantless searches
when the probationer is not put on notice by a state statute or during
sentencing. In United States v. Hill,152 the defendant's home was
searched without a search warrant or an explicit probation condition
authorizing warrantless searches of his home. 153 The law enforcement
officers conducted a search with the assistance of a drug dog and found
narcotics behind a ceiling tile in the bathroom. 154 The supervision
condition to which the defendant agreed required him to submit to a
probation officer's visit and allowed the officer to confiscate "contraband
observed in plain view." 15 5 None of the conditions of the defendant's

supervised release, however, authorized warrantless searches.156 The

149

419 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1306-07.
See id. at 1310-11.

`0

Id. at 1311.

147
148

'

See id. at 1309.

152

776 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015).

`3

Id. at 245-46.
Id.

154

15
See id. at 246-47 (describing Standard Condition of Supervision No. 10, which required
each defendant to "permit a Probation Officer to visit him or her at any time, at home or
elsewhere, and [to] permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the Probation
Officer").
"6
See id. at 248.
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court thus held that an officer must have a warrant supported by
probable cause when the terms of the probation condition do not subject
the probationer to warrantless intrusions on his or her property.157
In reaching its holding, the Fourth Circuit did not apply the
Knights balancing test because, unlike Knights, there was no probation
condition here allowing warrantless searches. 15 8 Therefore, the terms of
the probation did not create a lesser expectation of privacy on the part
of the defendant to balance against the government's interest in
monitoring probationers. 1 59 Instead, the court reasoned that the Fourth
Amendment requires that a probationer consent to warrantless
searches, and that a probationer's diminished expectation of privacy
under the law is not dispositive.16 0 The Fourth Circuit further stated
that, regardless of whether the probationer previously consented to
unannounced home visits, he did not consent to the warrantless
search.16 1 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit declined to apply the Griffin
special needs approach. The Hill court distinguished Griffin by stating
that the Griffin decision was confined to the facts before it, that there
was an express state regulation authorizing that warrantless search,
and that the Court there had declined "to approve searches of a
probationer's home predicated solely on reasonable suspicion." 162
The Hill court reached its decision by analogizing to United States
v. Bradley,163 an earlier, factually similar case in which the Fourth
Circuit held that the reduced privacy interest of a parolee coupled with
society's interest in having the parolee closely supervised did not
excuse the parole officer from complying with the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement. 164 The Bradley court thus specified that a parole
officer may not search a parolee's home without a warrant when no
regulation or individual parole condition explicitly allows for such a
search. 165 The Hill court, using Bradley as precedent, reasoned that,
"Bradley controls the outcome here unless intervening case law from

157

See id. at 249.

See id. (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119-20 (2001)) ("Relevant to both
[sides of the balancing test] was Knights's 'status as a probationer subject to a search condition.'
On the intrusion side, the Court concluded that '[t]he probation condition . . . significantly
diminished Knights'[s] reasonable expectation of privacy."').
15

See id.

'

See id. at 248.
See id.
Id. (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872, 880 (1987)).
571 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1978).

1
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1

Id. at 789-90.
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our court sitting en banc or the Supreme Court has explicitly or
implicitly overruled it."166 They found no intervening law.
Crucially, the Fourth Circuit solidified its split with the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits when it noted that the probationer's knowledge of the
warrantless search condition in Griffin and Knights, and the parolee's
notice of an express warrantless search condition in Samson, were
"critical" to the Supreme Court's determination that they had a
diminished expectation of privacy. 167 At a minimum, absent such a
condition, law enforcement officers cannot conduct a search of a
168
probationer's home without a warrant supported by probable cause.
Other sister circuits have reached a similar conclusion. In United
States v. Rea, 169 a case that predated Griffin, the defendant was on
probation for conspiracy to engage in the business of dealing in
firearms without a license when probation officers received an
anonymous tip.170 The search of the defendant's apartment led to the
discovery of a loaded pistol and ammunition, holsters, knives, tear gas
pellets, marijuana, and a triple beam scale. 171 The defendant had not
previously consented to warrantless searches of his apartment as part
of his probation conditions, nor did any of the recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement apply. 172 The Second Circuit took what would
later become the view of the Fourth Circuit in Hill, holding that the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement presumptively applies to
the search of a probationer's home where no state law or condition of
173
The
probation authorizes a warrantless search of the probationer.
Rea court reasoned that there had been "no showing that upholding the
warrant requirements for searches of probationers' homes [would]
seriously impede the accomplishment of the dual law enforcement and
174
rehabilitative goals of probation."
175
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Carnes, dealt
with a case that had a similar factual pattern and holding as the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Bradley. The case concerned a parolee who
was convicted of possession of firearm and ammunition by a felon,
illegal wiretapping, and witness tampering.17 6 The Sixth Circuit, also

166

167

Hill, 776 F.3d at 248 (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 248-49.

'
16'

See id. at 249-50.

10

Id. at 383.

17

Id. at 385.

172

Id. at 387-88.
See id.
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678 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1982).

id.
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309 F.3d 950 (6th Cir. 2002).
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Id. at 953.
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consistent with the Fourth Circuit, held that the warrantless search by
parole and police officers was unreasonable where neither the parole
agreement nor state regulation authorized searches without a
warrant. 177
C.

Understanding the Competing Stances

The circuit split over whether a probation officer's warrantless
search of a probationer's home violates the Fourth Amendment when
there is no explicit search condition can be explained by a few critical
differences in legal interpretation and policy rationale between the
courts on both sides. Those courts holding that officers may conduct a
warrantless search of probationers' homes without violating the Fourth
Amendment, even absent an explicit probation condition in the terms of
their probation that permits such a search, have taken a narrower view
of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits. The Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits rely on Samson and Knights to uphold warrantless searches of
a probationer's home even without explicit authority stated in the
probation agreement, so long as there is reasonable suspicion. This is
despite the fact that, in Knights, the Court upheld a probation
agreement provision that explicitly allowed searches of a probationer's
home, 178 and that in Samson, the Court upheld a parole agreement
condition that specifically authorized warrantless and suspicionless
searches of a parolee's person. 179 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits'
rationale centers solely on policy concerns, such that the combination of
a probationer's reduced expectation of privacy, and the government's
interest in keeping society safe from the probationer's potential future
actions render a search of a probationer's home reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.
Conversely, those courts that reject this formulation of law, and
instead require officers to have a warrant based on probable cause
before conducting a warrantless search when the terms of the probation
do not explicitly permit it, take a broader view of the Fourth
Amendment protections. The Fourth Circuit reads Knights and Griffin
to critically rest upon the specific probation condition in those cases
that authorized warrantless searches. As the next section will
demonstrate, instead of taking solely a policy approach, the Fourth
Circuit also relied on a legal basis for its holding, citing to a pre-Griffin
case, Bradley, which distinguished an agreement to home visits from

17
17
17

See id. at 962-63.
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006).
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an agreement to warrantless searches. 180 The Fourth Circuit then noted
that the Supreme Court has never since explicitly overruled the holding
in Bradley.18 1
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE SPLIT

There are two distinct ways to solve the split: (1) a legal solution,
and (2) a policy solution. Understanding the policy implications can

help illuminate what path the law should take, given the policy
objectives and concerns that the Supreme Court discussed, but these
implications need to be understood within the legal context of Fourth
Amendment case law. Ultimately, the policy and legal concerns
regarding probationers' Fourth Amendment rights demonstrate that
the proper resolution of the circuit split is to adopt the Fourth Circuit's
broader formulation of the Fourth Amendment protections.
The Legal Solution

A.

From the perspective of a legal solution, the question of whether an
officer's warrantless search of a probationer's home violates the Fourth
Amendment when there is no explicit search condition hinges upon the
Supreme Court's decisions in Griffin, Knights, and Samson. These
cases each stress the Court's emphasis on a specific term that
authorizes warrantless searches of a probationer, whether in the
probation agreement or in a relevant statute.
Griffin was the first case that posited that certain "special needs"
led to a recognition of less exacting Fourth Amendment standards to
search probationers. 1 8 2 While Griffin held that supervision, being a
"special need" of the State, permitted a degree of infringement upon
privacy, it also clarified that it upheld the search at issue "because it
was carried out pursuant to a published administrative regulation that
itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement
under well-established principles." 18 3 Thus, the Court emphasized that
its analysis was focused on the reasonableness of the specific state
regulation at issue, upholding the search because the "regulation ...
itself " satisfied the Fourth Amendment. 184 The Griffin Court confined
warrantless search pursuant to an
its decision to the facts before it-a
express regulation authorizing the same-and neither approved nor
disapproved the notion that searches of probationers' homes can be

"
1'
182
'
184

United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789-90 (4th Cir. 1978).
See United States v. Hill, 776 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2015).
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987).

Id. at 873.
Id.
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based solely on reasonable suspicion.1 8 5 The Court stated it was
unnecessary to "embrace a new principle of law, as the Wisconsin court
evidently did" that holds that any search of a probationer's home is
constitutional as long as law enforcement officers possessed "reasonable
grounds" to believe contraband was present.1 86 Thus, the Court, while
not outright rejecting warrantless searches without probation
conditions, is nonetheless strongly signaling its hostility to this
principle by rejecting the Wisconsin court's approach.
Following Griffin, the Supreme Court relied on a different test in
Knights. Unlike in Griffin, where the search was conducted by a
probation officer, the search in Knights was conducted by a police
officer for the purpose of a general criminal investigation. 187 Therefore,
the Court declined to follow the special needs approach, as under that
doctrine the search must involve a purpose other than "to detect
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing," 188 in favor of what Knights
termed "[their] general Fourth Amendment approach" of examining the
totality of the circumstances and balancing the interests. 189 The Court
concluded that the "probation order clearly expressed the search
condition," and the "probation condition thus significantly diminished
[the defendant's] reasonable expectation of privacy."19 0 Given the
implicit signals the Court has given, along with its reluctance to issue
sweeping proclamations about the status of probationers, the Fourth
Circuit's broader view of the Fourth Amendment protections is the
stronger position.
Lastly, in Samson, the Court went beyond Knights to hold that, in
the case of parolees, searches may be conducted without any suspicion
and without any administrative framework supplying neutral
criteria. 19 1 The Samson Court relied on the fact that parolees had fewer
expectations of privacy than probationers, that the State had a strong
interest in supervising parolees, and that the parole search condition
was clearly expressed to the defendant. 192 Therefore, there was
significant weight given, once again, to the explicit search condition
being clearly expressed to the defendant, suggesting that, in the
absence of such an explicit condition, it would likely be
unconstitutional.

Id. at 872, 880.
186

Id.

187

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114-15 (2001).
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000).
Knights, 534 U.S. at 118 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).
Id. at 119-20.
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006).
Id. at 850-53.
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Additionally, a strict reading would likewise distinguish the
privacy expectations of parolees from the privacy expectations of
probationers, making it more difficult to analogize Samson to cases
involving probationers. The Griffin and Knights Courts only spoke of
probationers, not parolees, when discussing the diminished expectation
of privacy continuum. 193 In contrast, the Samson Court mentioned both
parolees and probationers, stating that parolees have lower
expectations of privacy than probationers because probationers are
lower on the continuum of punishment than parolees. 194 Therefore,
although the Supreme Court has previously suggested there is no
difference in the constitutional status of probationers and parolees, in
practice, the Court appears to treat these statuses differently under the
Fourth Amendment, as seen in Samson. This could be of importance if
the parolee's lesser expectation of privacy made enough of a difference
as to change the outcome had the defendant in Samson been a
probationer. Yet, while the Court has not clearly spoken on whether
this "no suspicion required" rule also applies to probationers, because
the Court in practice treats probationers as having greater
constitutional rights than parolees, a narrow interpretation of Samson
would result in its holding not being applied to probationers at this
time.
1. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuit mischaracterize the
Supreme Court's legal precedent.
The Fifth Circuit mischaracterizes Supreme Court precedent. Most
importantly, it conflates the Griffin and Knights precedents. In United
States v. Keith, the Fifth Circuit stated that, "The core reasoning of the
Court in both cases is directed at explaining why the needs of the
probation system outweigh the privacy rights of the probationers[.]"1 9 5
The Keith court then used this as a rationale to apply both the Griffin
special needs test and the Knights balancing test to the case at hand,
an approach that appears in no Supreme Court precedent.
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the consistent line of case law in
Louisiana approving the practice of searching probationers' homes
based on reasonable suspicion served as a substantially equal
replacement for a Griffin-like state regulation. 196 While case law
provides sufficient notice, a statute or an explicit condition would
provide even better notice. Yet, even assuming, arguendo, that the two

'

Knights, 534 U.S. at 119; Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987).
Samson, 547 U.S. at 850.
United States v. Keith, 375 F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 2004).
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situations are analogous, the Fifth Circuit then used this "Griffin-like"
substitute to create a diminished expectation of privacy. Based on this
contrived diminished expectation of privacy, the court then held that
the warrantless searches of probationers was lawful. 197 Nowhere in
Griffin does the Court hold that the warrantless search was justified
because the state regulation created a diminished expectation of
privacy. Instead, the Griffin Court used the "special needs" of the
probation system to uphold the state regulation that itself authorized
warrantless searches of the probationer's home. 198 Not the other way
around, and not through a balancing approach. As to Knights, the Fifth
Circuit is not entirely wrong to conclude that a core rationale of the
holding was based on the probationer's diminished expectation of
privacy. This, however, followed from the explicit probation condition
allowing warrantless searches. 199 It did not derive from explaining why
the "needs" of the probation system outweigh the privacy rights of
probationers, as the Knights Court declined to use the Griffin special
needs test when the search was by law enforcement. 200 Ultimately,
then, the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Griffin and Knights is
incorrect, and there is no legal precedent that supports the conflation of
the two tests. It is clear that the Keith court attempted to combine the
two tests in an effort to affirm the conviction in the absence of a legal
justification for doing so.
The Eleventh Circuit makes an equally erroneous determination.
In United States v. Carter, the court sought a substitute for an explicit
probation condition allowing warrantless searches which would create
a diminished expectation of privacy. The probation condition in Carter,
however, only required the defendant to "submit to visits by the
probation officer at his home, workplace, or elsewhere." 20 1 It did not
require him to submit to warrantless searches of his home, as agreeing
to submit to visits by a probation officer in the home does not equate to
agreeing to submit to warrantless searches of the home-the latter
being a far more intrusive invasion. 202 In contrast, the conditions in
both Griffin and Knights, to which the Cartercourt compares this case,
explicitly allowed warrantless searches of the probationer's home. In
attempting to equate the probation condition at hand with the one in
Id. at 350-51.
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875-76.
199 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119-20 (2001).
... Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 859-60 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201
United States v. Carter, 566 F.3d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 2009).
. See United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 462 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding the
constitutionality of a warrantless "visit" to the home of a person on supervised released, but
emphasizing that warrantless home "visits" were specifically authorized by statue, and that home
"searches" raise different issues, as "a home visit is far less intrusive than a probation search").
18
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Griffin and Knights, the Eleventh Circuit departed from legal
precedent. It even admits to the fact that "none of [their] binding
precedent holds that a probationer is subject to reasonable suspicion
searches solely because he is a probationer[.]" 2 03 The Eleventh Circuit
then unsuccessfully attempted to overcome this inadequacy in
precedent by relying heavily on policy rationales.
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit misinterprets the Knights
balancing test. The test does not start off presumptively in favor of the
government. Rather, it starts out as an even playing field, and then
particular circumstances sway it either way. As in Knights, the most
relevant circumstance would be the defendant's awareness of an
explicit search condition, which would lessen his expectation of privacy
and tilt the scale in favor of the government. That is clearly not the
situation in Carter, as there was no explicit search condition. Therefore,
there is no basis in law for the Eleventh Circuit's approach.
2. The Fourth Circuit correctly characterizes the Supreme Court's
legal precedent.
In stark contrast, the Fourth Circuit's approach adheres to legal
precedent. In United States v. Hill, the Fourth Circuit relied on a
factually and legally similar past circuit case, United States v. Bradley,
to hold that a probation officer must secure a warrant prior to
conducting a search of a probationer's place of residence, even where
the probationer consented to periodic and unannounced visits by the
probation officer. 2 0 4 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, "Since Bradley,
the Supreme Court has decided three cases dealing with privacy
interests of individuals on probation or parole. None calls into question
Bradley's core holding." 205 In so holding, the Fourth Circuit correctly
read Griffin as not expanding the special needs doctrine. Therefore,
Griffin does not reach the issue of whether an officer may search a
probationer's home without a warrant when no regulation or individual
probation condition allows it.206 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit
appropriately recognized Knights to hold that an explicit probation
condition acts to diminish a probationer's expectation of privacy on the
"intrusion" side of the balancing test.2 0 7 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit
logically reasoned that, because there is no probation condition
allowing warrantless searches in Hill, there is nothing on the

203

Carter, 566 F.3d at 973.

204

United States v. Hill, 776 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.

206
206
207

Id. at 248-49.
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"intrusion" side of the reasonableness test to make the Knights legal
analysis analogous to the case at hand. Also, in this regard, the Fourth
Circuit correctly read Samson's legal analysis, like Knights, to depend
on the parolees' notice of an express warrantless search condition. 208 In
contrast, the Eleventh Circuit, even though its decision came after
Samson, does not attempt to reconcile its holding with the Samson
decision.
Beyond most closely adhering to legal precedent, the Fourth
Circuit's broader reading is also more in line with the intent of the
Fourth Amendment. The totality of the circumstances balancing test "is
not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away
and disappears." 209 The protection of the Fourth Amendment "consists
in requiring that those [reasonable inferences made by law
enforcement] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime." 210 The Fourth Amendment thus states that "no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." 2 11 Such a requirement
ensures that when the right of privacy must yield to the right of a
search, it should be done by a neutral judicial officer, and not by the
discretion of law enforcement officers. 212 Therefore, as the Fourth
Circuit rightly held, without a condition implicating a warrant
exception, a warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment.
Taken together, the legal approach thus leads to resolving the
circuit split in favor of the Fourth Circuit. The legal approach, as
compared to the policy-based approach of other circuits, cautions us to
respect the words of the Fourth Amendment and not allow it to be used
to conduct excessive searches of probationers, leading reasonable minds
to find the Fourth Circuit's analysis the most compelling. Ultimately,
the Fourth Circuit follows precedent in a way that most closely
resembles the intent of the Fourth Amendment, recognizing the
protections in place that stem from the requirement of a warrant and
probable cause are a nullity in the hands of complete law enforcement
discretion in this area. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits instead gloss
over the Supreme Court's emphasis on the probationer or parolee's
knowledge of the warrantless search condition in Griffin, Knights, and

2"
209
210

21

Id. at 249.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971).
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

See Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 ("Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support
a
magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in
212

making a search without a warrant would reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to a nullity.").
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Samson, thus extending the right to search beyond what legal
precedent allows, and what good policy would counsel.
The Policy Perspective

B.

The dual policy concerns regarding probation are rehabilitation of
the individual and protecting society from future criminal violations. 213
These concerns further support the notion that probationers have a
lower expectation of privacy. 214 The Fourth Circuit's approach correctly
considers the policy implications and gives them the appropriate
weight.
It is possible that the Fourth Circuit's approach will make it more
difficult for probation officers to facilitate rehabilitation and prevent
recidivism. As both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits addressed,
probationers do not enjoy "the absolute liberty to which every citizen is
entitled," and the government has a significant interest in preventing
future criminal violations. 2 15 Adopting the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits'
rationale furthers some of the goals of probation set forth by the
Supreme Court: it allows officers to better protect society from a
possibly violent probationer, and it rehabilitates probationers by
encouraging them to assimilate into society and refrain from violating
their probation conditions. 2 16 By allowing officers to conduct
warrantless searches of probationers' homes even absent an explicit
probation condition, officers have greater authority over individuals
that they decide pose a high danger to society. Further, the threat and
uncertainty of whether a probationer's home will be searched at any
moment without a warrant encourages probationers to follow the rules
and refrain from engaging in criminal activity, acting as an effective
deterrent to recidivism. 217 Limiting the scope of these searches thus
arguably hinders the effectiveness of probation as an alternative to
incarceration.
While these concerns are legitimate, one can consider
rehabilitation and recidivism without sacrificing probationers' Fourth

213
214

See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120-21 (2001).
See id. at 119-20.

215
See United States v. Keith, 375 F.3d 346, 350-51 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Carter,
566 F.3d 970, 974-75 (11th Cir. 2009).
216
See Collin L. Ryan, Warrantless Searches for Probationers: The Reasonableness of

SCOTUS's Balancing Test, THE UC LAW REVIEW FORUM (Apr. 16, 2015), http:Iuc
lawreview.org/2015/04/16/warrantless-searches-for-probationers-the-reasonableness-of-scotussbalancing-test/ [https://perma.ccIW35L-LUPP] (advocating for the Eleventh Circuit's approach
based on policy considerations).
217
Sean M. Kneafsey, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Probationers:What Remains after
Waiving Their Right to Be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures?, 35 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1237, 1261-62 (1995).
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Amendment rights. For example, in the context of the First
Amendment, when crafting hate crimes legislation, it would certainly
be easier to completely ban people's ability to use hate speech. Yet, in
an attempt to protect people's constitutional liberties, the Court instead
chooses to restrict only their ability to use hate speech when it invokes
violent conduct. 218 There are countless other situations where the Court
could see maximal enforcement at the cost of liberty and privacy, but
declines to do so. This is one of those situations.
The Supreme Court clearly articulated that the primary purpose of
the warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment is to guard against
unlawful searches and seizures inside a home: "It is axiomatic that the
physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed." 219 The Court has thus held that
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable. 220 It is from this presumption the Fourth
Circuit balances the policy concerns against a probationer's Fourth
Amendment rights. While recognizing that the governmental interest
in supervision is great, that the probationer has a diminished
expectation of privacy, and that society has an interest in having the
probationer closely supervised, the Fourth Circuit still held that these
considerations do not excuse an officer from complying with the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement. 221 Searches of a probationer's
home are not a necessary ingredient of every probationer's
supervision. 222 Rather, the decision to search without a warrant rests
on an officer's discretion. How much discretion should these officers
have, and whether officers use the right factors in exercising such
discretion is an unanswered, yet important, question.
Supporters of warrantless searches of probationers fail to explain
why the ordinary warrant requirement cannot work for probationers. 2 23
Probable cause and the warrant process are not inflexible. The warrant
requirement acts to protect probationers' Fourth Amendment rights
without unreasonably restricting officers' supervisory roles.
Furthermore, the idea that rehabilitative goals of probationers are
impeded by a warrant requirement is erroneous. In fact, indiscriminate
searches could undermine the rehabilitative process. 224 The

See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88, 490 (1993).
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (internal quotations omitted).
220
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
221
See United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789-90 (4th Cir. 1978).
222
See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 256 (9th Cir. 1975) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
223
See Bradley, 571 F.2d at 789 (citing Latta, 521 F.2d at 256).
224
See William R. Rapson, Extending Search-and-Seizure Protection to Parolees in
California,
22 STAN. L. REV. 129, 134-35 (1969).
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rehabilitation process depends on trust and respect between the
probationer and probation officer, and "[r]esponsibility and respect for
the rights of others presuppose certain reasonable expectations that
one's own privacy will be respected." 225 Thus, "[w]hen a [probation]
officer indiscriminately searches his [probationer's] person, home, or
effects, rehabilitation is thwarted because earlier patterns of
resentment and distrust of law-enforcement officials are reinforced." 22 6
This type of invasion of privacy only diminishes the probationer's
confidence and trust in either his probation officer or in the rule of
law. 2 2 7 On the other hand, fair treatment will enhance the chance of
rehabilitation of probationers by avoiding reactions to the arbitrariness
of the probation officers. 228 As the goal of rehabilitation is a large
rationale behind the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit's holdings, these
findings challenge their legal arguments for warrantless searches.
Additionally, there are alternative options other than warrantless
searches to promote the policy of rehabilitation, such as requiring a
drug test three to four times a week for those convicted of drug-related
crimes. In that regard, the rationale for rehabilitation might not be as
potent for those on probation for conduct such as white-collar crimes, as
drug tests likely are not an effective monitoring device for non-drug
offenders on probation. A categorical bar on searches of both classes of
probationers will prevent officers from making arbitrary decisions on
which probationers warrant a "heightened interest," and instead
require officers to go through the court system to rule on such a
determination. The underlying concern of the Fourth Circuit hinges on
what measures officers may undertake in protecting the public. While
proponents of the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits' approach argue that
officers can only conduct warrantless searches for those in whom the
government has a "heightened interest," 229 the question of whether
officers should have complete discretion to decide what exactly is
worthy of increased scrutiny is still a concern. For instance, who
decides what is a victimless crime or not and, thus, whether the
government would have a heightened interest in protecting society?
Lastly, it is worth noting that appellate courts should not be the
party addressing this policy concern in the first place. If the police or
Id. at 134 (internal citation omitted).
See id. at 134-35.
227 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 886 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I fail to see
how the role of the probation agent in fostering growth and development of the client ... is
enhanced . . . by the ability to conduct a search without the checks provided by prior neutral
review. [T]he power to decide to search will prove a barrier to establishing any degree of trust.")
(internal citations omitted).
228 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 83, 88.
229 See Ryan, supra
note 216.
225

226
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probation officer already had the opportunity to put in a specific
condition in the probation agreement authorizing warrantless searches,
but chose not to, the policy concern should be considered addressed,
and deference should be given to that decision. Appellate courts should
not be making ex post decisions on a probationer's "dangerousness"
when the probation hearing already offered the opportunity to make a
decision one way or the other. Furthermore, decisions regarding a
probationer's "dangerousness" status are fact-intensive inquiries, 230 and
appellate courts generally are not in a good position to make such factspecific determinations. 2 3 1
Ultimately, the potential policy concerns regarding probationers do
not excuse law enforcement officers from complying with the Fourth
Amendment. Although the state's interest in protecting society by
rehabilitating probationers is compelling, limitations of Fourth
Amendment rights are unnecessary to achieve that end. Home visits,
where probation officers may use general observations made during avisit and the "plain view" doctrine to seize evidence, reporting
requirements, and normal law enforcement methods, along with the
built-in flexibility of the probable cause and warrant requirement, are
sufficient to meet the state's interests. 232 Probation serves as a
substitute for the incarceration of convicted criminals. Courts favor
probation for offenders of less serious crimes because it represents a
healthy alternative to incarceration. 2 33 Probation seeks to maximize the
liberty of the offender while still protecting the public from that
individual's potential future violations of the law 23 4 Courts and a
probation officers should not treat probationers like prisoners. When a
probation officer conducts a warrantless, suspicionless, or otherwise
random search of a probationer to deter criminal conduct, the officer
actually undermines the trust between herself and the probationer.
Thus, impermissible and intrusive searches may injure, rather than
promote, the state's interests.
Deciding the circuit split in favor of the Fourth Circuit will strike a
better balance of these interests by allowing for warrantless searches
when the exceptions that are carved out in legal jurisprudence allow

230
See John A. Henderson, A Square Meaning for a Round Phrase: Applying the Career
Offender Provision's "Crime of Violence" to the Diminished Capacity Provision of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1475, 1509 (1995) (arguing that under an incapacitation

paradigm, deciding whether an offender presents a danger of recidivism and then analyzing the
severity of the potential future offense, requires a fact-specific inquiry).

See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 403 (1990).
Sunny A. M. Koshy, The Right of (All) the People to Be Secure: Extending Fundamental
Fourth Amendment Rights to Probationersand Parolees, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 449, 481 (1988).
233
See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 1.2 (Approved Draft 1970).
231

232

23

See id.
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them, while at the same time protecting probationers' Fourth
Amendment rights. Although unlimited search powers would increase
the number of violations that police can detect, "[the] fundamental
Fourth Amendment rights need not and should not be abridged in the
name of more efficient law enforcement." 235
VI. CONCLUSION

The purpose of a probation search is to advance the goals of an
individual's probation and should not be used as a "subterfuge" for a
criminal investigation. 2 36 The realistic goals of probation justify the
conclusion that some Fourth Amendment rights of probationers are not
protected to the same extent as other citizens. These exceptions,
however, should strike a fair balance between the needs of the
probation system and the privacy interests of those persons on
probation, and this requires a more careful analysis than the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits have undertaken. Despite the Supreme Court's
strong language concerning the "fundamental nature" of these rights, 237
most courts have failed to carefully scrutinize encroachments on
probationers' Fourth Amendment rights. This is due in part to the
Supreme Court's move from a special needs analysis in Griffin v.
Wisconsin, to a broader totality of the circumstances balancing analysis
in United States v. Knights and Samson v. California.
From this Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Eleventh and Fifth
Circuits have held that police officers may conduct a warrantless
search of probationers' homes without violating the Fourth
Amendment, even though there is no explicit condition in the terms of
their probation that permits such a search. The Fourth Circuit, by
contrast, has rejected this formulation of the law. Instead, it requires
officers to have probable cause before conducting a warrantless search
when the terms of the probation do not explicitly permit warrantless
searches.
Courts confronting this question had to determine the proper
construction of probation conditions when they are silent on the
officer's ability to search the probationer's home without a warrant.
235

Koshy, supra note 232, at 476 (internal citations omitted).

See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1975).
See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1973) (quoting Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)) ("These [Fourth Amendment
rights] . . . belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms.... Uncontrolled search and seizure is
one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government."); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) ("The
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the
fourth amendment-is basic to a free society . . . [and is] implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.").
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Does the absence of a clear statement mean this practice is allowed
under the Fourth Amendment? The Fourth Circuit's response is the
proper interpretation of the silence, finding that the needs of the
probation system are not of such great importance as to override an
individual's privacy rights when the probationer has not previously
consented to the invasion of his privacy through warrantless searches.
The Fourth Circuit changes the conversation not by asking what
probationers expect in regard to privacy, but rather, what justification
there is for departing from the normal Fourth Amendment
protections. 238 Such an interpretation adequately emphasizes the
fundamental nature of one's Fourth Amendment rights. Ultimately,
then, the circuit split should be resolved in favor of the Fourth Circuit's
broader approach to the Fourth Amendment protections: absent an
explicit probation condition stating the probationer will be subject to
warrantless searches, law enforcement officers cannot conduct a search
of a probationer's home without a warrant or probable cause.

2'

See Koshy, supra note 232, at 471.

